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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines discretion in New Zealand's social security law and practice. The paper 
summarises the academic writing on the discretion versus rules debate. It highlights factors 
which impact on an official's exercise of discretion in the social security context. It then 
examines specific examples of discretion found in the Social Security Act 1964 and analyses 
the relevant policy and practice of the New Zealand Income Support Service. 
The author argues that although a residual discretion is necessary in social security law to 
ensure individualised justice, in practice, the distinction between rules and discretion is 
becoming blurred. Discretionary supplementary assistance is now tightly regulated by 
descriptive ministerial directives and welfare programmes , and entitlement arises upon 
satisfying detailed criteria. Given this reality, the paper focuses on ways to improve the 
quality of service offered by the New Zealand Income Support Service. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 15,000 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Williams notes that "no field of legislation more intimately concerns the citizen than the 
social security and welfare legislation", 1 and yet the legislation, policy and practice of the 
Department of Social Welfare remains largely a mystery to both lawyers and the public alike. 
The provision of social security is authorised by the Social Security Act 1964 ("the Act") and 
is administered by the New Zealand Income Support Service ("the NZISS"). A large number 
of decisions made under the Act are discretionary in nature. 
Discretion in welfare law is a valuable tool enabling decision-makers to take account of 
individual circumstances, but the guidelines and practical application of discretion need 
constant monitoring to ensure that decisions are made properly and according to the law. This 
paper examines the legality of the NZISS's interpretation of selected practical examples of 
discretion found in the Act. 
It is generally accepted that bureaucracies require a mixture of both discretion and rules to 
function most efficiently. Traditionally, rules have provided certainty, whilst an element of 
discretion is required to ensure individualised justice.2 This paper discusses the theory 
surrounding the discretion versus rules debate. It highlights the changing attitude of the 
current Government towards social security, demonstrating the practical consequences for 
beneficiaries through the selected examples. 
The findings of the High Court regarding the highly discretionary special benefit, authorised 
by s61G of the Act, are discussed, along with recent changes to the Special Needs Grant 
Programme, authorised under s124(l)(d) of the Act. The policy and practice of the NZISS in 
relation to the discretion to impose a 26 week stand-down for misconduct as an employee is 
examined. Finally the discretion of the NZISS to write off over-payments made to 
beneficiaries is analysed. 
New Zealand's formerly comprehensive social security system has been radically altered over 
the last six years with the introduction of heavy targeting. This approach has ensured fiscal, 
to the detriment of social, responsibility. Part VI describes the recent action of the 
Government to enable further targeting of supplementary assistance by attempting to 
introduce regulations to govern what is currently discretionary assistance. The progress of the 
1 D GT Williams "Judicial Restraint and Judicial Re\'iew: The Role of lhe Courts in Welfare Law" in M 
Partington & J Jowell (eds) Welfare Law & Policy - S111dies in Teaching, Praclice and Research (Nichols 
Publishing Co, New York, 1979) 101. 
2c Harlow & R Rawlings Law and Admi11is1ra1io11 (Weidenfcld & Nicholson, London , 1984) 145. 
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Social Welfare Reform Bill 1995 is described along with the responses of welfare groups to 
the proposed changes. 
It is the author's submission that in recent times the distinction between rules and discretion in 
social security law and practice has become blurred such that the exercise of discretion is 
increasingly dictated by restrictive guidelines and detailed, exhaustive definitions. Support 
for this proposition is found from the courts who have commented that upon satisfying 
detailed discretionary criteria, an entitlement arises for the claimant.3 
Given this environment, Part VII discusses ways to improve decision-making at the NZISS. 
Current statutory review procedures are discussed and suggestions for improvement made. 
Finally, the role of the Ombudsmen and judicial review in the social security context is 
described. 
II DISCRETION VERSUS RULES 
The definition adopted in this paper is that public officials have discretion whenever the 
effective limits of their power leave them free to make a choice among possible courses of 
action or inaction:+ This is contrasted with rule-based provisions in which a definite detailed 
legal consequence attaches to a definite detailed state of affairs.5 Some legislative provisions 
authorising official action combine elements of both rules and discretion. 
This section discusses the different categories of discretion which may exist. The problems 
faced specifically by providers of social security are addressed, along with the traditional 
attitude of welfare groups towards discretion. Common criticisms of discretion are 
highlighted and consideration is given to whether these would be solved through the 
implementation of rule-guided procedures. 
An official's discretion may be categorised in the following ways: strong or weak, formal or 
informal, and provisional or final. Strong discretion is found where a rule allows an official 
to provide something desired by the claimant, but the rule imposes no constraint on what is to 
be given to any particular individual.6 This is contrasted with weak discretion where a rule 
3Ankers v Alforney-Genera/ (No. 2) [J995] NZAR 418, 4'.W-421. 
-+Davis cited in M Adler and S Asquith Discrerion and Welfare (Heinemann Educational Books, London , 1981) 
9. 
5J Black, S Harrop, J Hughes Income Supporl Law and Practice (Butterworths, Wellington, 1995) A/162. 
6This is sometimes referred to as discretion based on the absence of any rule, but this is inconect since all 
statutory discretion is exercised under some rnlc. RE Goodin "Welfare Rights, Law and Discretion" [ 1986] 
6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 232,234; An example of strong discretion in the Act is s61G which 
authorises the payment of special benefit. 
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directs an official to provide something under certain conditions, but the official retains the 
option to decide who receives what. Sub-categories of weak discretion include formal and 
informal discretion. Formal discretion exists where the range of options available to an 
official is explicitly stated in the rules. The range of options available is merely implicit in 
informal discretion. Discretion is further differentiated by whether the decision of the official 
is final or not. Provisional discretion means the decision is subject to review and possible 
overturning by another official. Ultimate discretion is not subject to review by another 
official, although it may be subject to judicial review by the courts. Statutory discretion 
usually involves a combination of the various categories.7 
The discretion given to public officials is conferred by legislation. It is often quoted that 
I 
discretion is like a doughnut such that it does not exist except as an area left open by a 
surrounding belt of restriction. 8 However, the analogy of discretion to a sponge is preferred 
by Sossin.9 She considers that discretion is shaped by far more than the legal structures 
surrounding it. Sossin views discretion as porous and shaped by politics and values. 
The provision of social security by the state creates unique problems which arise from 
political, fiscal and moral values, and the logistics of a centralised bureaucracy. It will be 
shown that volume, values and power imbalances present special problems for administrators 
of social security. 
The current societal reality is that vast and increasing numbers of people are requiring 
financial support from the state. Volume is seen as the cardinal enemy of discretion and 
individualisation, where heavy caseloads force routinisation. IO Additionally, society 
distinguishes between the deserving and the undeserving poor. The elderly and disabled 
constitute the deserving poor, whereas the unemployed and solo parents are considered 
undeserving. It was noted by the Honourable Dr Michael Cullen, MP, that much of New 
Zealand's social security system still makes such a distinction. 11 Society's attitude towards 
the poor has been reflected in the organisation and structure of programmes providing 
support. 12 
7For example, there may be weak, formal , provisional discretion. 
8R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977) 3 l. 
9L Sossin "Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry into Authority, Discretion and the Possibility of Engagement 
in the Welfare State" f 1994) '.26 Ot1awa LR l , l'.2. 
IOJ Handler "Discretion in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Ruic of Law" in P Robson (cd) Welfare 
Law (Dartmouth, Hanls, 1992) 396. 
I 1(1995) 550 N/J.JJ) 8801. 
12For example, until recently, NZISS policy manuals stated that unemployment beneficiaries were not able to 
access an advance on their benefits , even though the legislation did not preclude them. 
3 
Liberal legalism views the relationship of citizen to the state as individualistic and 
adversarial. l3 Beneficiaries, however, are extremely dependent on the state for financial 
assistance and, in many cases, have an ongoing relationship with a particular caseworker. In 
nearly every case, beneficiaries are financially precluded from asserting their rights through 
the courts, the quintessential check on abuse of administrative power. 14 
The power imbalance which exists between a beneficiary and an official is formalised in 
social security legislation. The bureaucracy controls information, resources, the power of 
retaliation, and staff, pressed for time, may think they know what is best for the clients. 15 The 
beneficiary, on the other hand, may feel insecure, and fear imposing themself or taking up too 
much time. 16 Beneficiaries are currently ill-equipped to participate in, or understand, the 
structures and procedures of the administration. Discretion implies discussion, bargaining 
and a minimal sharing of power. Handler argues that the dependent poor cannot adequately 
participate in the decision-making process. 17 Discretion requires that beneficiaries have 
information and resources to legitimate the process and to redress the power imbalance. 
It is the power imbalance, and the inherent potential for abuse, between beneficiaries and 
officials which have, traditionally, led welfare advocates to call for a return to legality and the 
curbing of discretion in social security legislation. 18 Discretion, it has been argued, leads to 
undesirable social control by officials and standards of morality imposed on beneficiaries 
which are not imposed on the rest of the community. 19 
Advocates of rule-governed systems argue that discretion results in inconsistent and arbitrary 
decisions by both officials and appeal tribunals. 20 Officials with strong, formal, ultimate 
discretion need not have or give reasons for deciding one way or the other.21 In this sense, 
they may act arbitrarily. The corollary to arbitrariness is the claim of uncertainty and 
insecurity in a discretionary system. Discretionary decisions may prevent beneficiaries from 
understanding how the system works due to ignorance of the considerations of officials. 
13Above n 10,401. 
1-+Evidence is found in the paucity of claims taken to the High Court on benefit issues over the years. Of these 
cases, a number were brought by superannuitants who, traditionally, have had more financial resources. The 
possibility of receiving civil legal aid to bring a claim is discussed in Part VII, along\\ ith the barriers to the 
process. 
15Above n 10,397. 
16Above n 10, 403. 
17 Above n 10,397. 
l8Above n 6,239. 
19Above n 6,240 
20 Above n 2, 588. 
21 Above n 6, 24'2. 
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Goodin argues that discretion reduces certainty and that the poor are the most sensitive to 
such uncertainties.22 
The benefit of discretion is that it allows an official to assess support based on the individual 
needs and circumstances of the beneficiary. Discretion, therefore, must be exercised having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case. It is argued that this necessarily means more 
intrusive mechanisms are required to assess whether or not to exercise the discretion.23 
Breaches of privacy and the intrusiveness of officials' information gathering have been cited 
as reasons against discretion in social security.24 Welfare advocates argue that welfare 
institutions will only be improved with a return to legality.25 
Some scholars argue that those seeking the accountability of government should press for 
rules because "open rules provide a basis for argument around policy and for criticism of 
administrative action" .26 Prosser argues that discretion can provide the means by which 
government can avoid making difficult policy decisions by not clearly stating what policy is 
to be followed. 27 If a legislative purpose can be found , however, Prosser suggests the issue 
of rules versus discretion becomes a technical one, establishing what will most feasibly 
achieve the objectives of the legislation. 28 Prosser sees the chief purpose of litigation of 
welfare issues to be the raising of awareness as a basis for political mobilisation rather than as 
a means of providing direct reform. 29 
Other scholars have noted that those wishing to limit discretion have, in tum, sought greater 
procedural rights for those subject to it. 30 Procedural rights refer to a process which must be 
followed, such as the principles of natural justice. Substantive rights, on the other hand, refer 
to an outcome, for example, the receipt of the unemployment benefit at a certain rate. 
Adler and Asquith comment that the strengthening of procedural rights in no way guarantees 
the enhancement of substantive rights. Indeed, with increasing demands for financial support 
and scarcity of resources, the increased procedural rights may well legitimate the 
22Above n 6, 243. 
23Abovc n 6, 247. 
2--1-An example of intrusive behaviour by officials in determining whether or not to pro\'ide discretionary 
assistance was highlighted recently in Christchurch. Christchurch NZISS taff were searching people's 
cupboards who were applying for special needs grants for food to assess whether they really needed the 
assistance or not. Sec "Kitchen search Irks Pair Seeking Food Aid" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 15 April 1996, 3. 
25Above n 4, 9. 
261" Prosser "The Politics of Discretion: Aspects of Discretionary Power in the Supplementary Benefits Scheme" 
in Adler & Asquith, above n 4, 169. 
27 Above n 26 169. 
28Abovc n 26 169 
29Above n 26, 170. 
30Above n 4, 17. 
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administration whilst masking the effects of expenditure cuts and drawing attention away 
from continuing substantive inequalities. 31 
Goodin notes that the problems associated with discretion are not necessarily solved by 
implementing rule-based systems. It has been argued that arbitrariness, intrusiveness and 
uncertainty will remain.32 Goodin believes that only the potential for manipulation and 
exploitation will be removed, but Harlow queries even this, noting that "administrators well 
understand how to play games with rules".33 
Arbitrariness may remain in rule-based systems because officials can cite the rules without 
justifying, or giving reasons for, the decision.3-+ The range of considerations specified by the 
rules may appear as uncertain and arbitrary to the beneficiary as discretionary 
considerations.35 If the conditions are formalised and restricted, the result may be objectively 
worse for the beneficiary. There may be certainty at the expense of adequate assistance. The 
claims of intrusiveness and breach of privacy are endemic to the provision of social security. 
Intrusiveness could be reduced, but at the expense of individual justice.36 
Opposition to rule-based systems criticises the procedures as inflexible, impersonal and 
insensitive to differing needs.37 Rules do not allow for individualised justice. As rules 
define, they necessarily also restrict. In the process of interpreting rules, officials often subtly 
redefine them.38 It is not clear, either, that increasingly complex regulatory language prevents 
abuse of the system.39 
It is generally accepted that discretion and rules are on a continuum. For a bureaucracy to 
work efficiently, a balance of both discretion and rules is desirable. The task for legislators is 
to find the optimum point on the scale. It has been shown that similar problems occur under 
discretionary and rule-based systems. Rules create unique problems too. Accepting that an 
element of discretion is necessary for the efficient administration of a bureaucracy, the 
question is how to ensure that the discretion is well exercised. The various ways to achieve 
this will be discussed later in the paper. 
31Abo,·e n 4, 18- 19. 
32Above n 6, 250. 
33Abovc n 2, 162. 
3-+A bove n 6, 250. 
35Abovc n 6, 251. 
36 A bovc n 6, 252. 
37 Above n 2, 11. 
38Abovc n 6,258. 
39Abovc n 9, 42. 
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The main justification for discretion is the need for individualised justice. This is particularly 
pertinent in the provision of social security where the range of extraordinary contingencies 
cannot be provided for in the rules. The best proposal appears to be to guarantee a certain 
baseline benefit with deviations only in a upward direction. 40 With this format, volume can 
be dealt with without sacrificing the individual. 
This is, theoretically, the approach of the New Zealand social security legislation, where, in 
general terms, basic benefits are given upon fulfilling certain criteria, and supplementary 
assistance is given on a discretionary basis according to the individual circumstances of the 
case. It will be shown, however, that within the supposedly rule-based basic benefits a variety 
of discretionary decisions are made by staff, and that entitlement arises in discretionary 
supplementaries upon satisfying the listed criteria. Indeed, the discretionary supplementary 
assistance is becoming rule-like in its application, due to the heavy targeting. 
In the past New Zealand had a universalist approach to superannuation and family benefit. A 
universalist approach to social services is entitlement by all irrespective of the incomes and 
means of individual recipients. Selectivity involves discrimination between people who are 
within determined categories. Implicit in the selective approach is some kind of test of need 
related to the individual's own resources.41 The formerly universal schemes no longer exist in 
that form, and the entire social security system is now heavily targeted. 
Rules and discretion are only ever as good as the policies which underlie them. Legislators 
and policy makers are finding mechanisms which ensure that only the "needy" receive 
assistance from the state. In theory, targeting should make more resources available for the 
poorest in society. The last few years, however, have seen a drastic change in the 
Government's concept of the "needy". The following section illustrates the current National 
Government's radical change in approach to social security from previous years. 
III POLICIES UNDERLYING SOCIAL SECURITY 
A Royal Commission on Social Security, 1972 
The 1972 Royal Commission described the principles on which the social security benefit 
system was originally based in the following way: 42 
-IOJudicial comments on the legality of unidirectional discretion will be discussed in Part V. 
41 Royal Commission 011 Social Sernrity in New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 1972) 132. 
-l-2Above n 41, 65. 
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l. Social security is a community responsibility, with a legitimate function of the state being 
the redistribution of income so as to ensure that everyone can live with dignity; 
2. Eligibility should be based on need. Need is identified by circumstances (ie sickness) and 
measurement (ie an income test). In some circumstances, such as age, need can be assumed 
to exist; 
3. Eligibility should be based on residence rather than contribution to any social security 
fund; 
4. Benefits should be paid at a level which enables people to participate in and belong to the 
community. 
B Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988 
The objectives of social security, as seen by the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy, are 
described as follows:43 
1. The right to a sufficient share of resources to allow full participation in society; 
2. The relief of immediate need arising through unforeseen circumstances; 
3. A commitment to ensuring the well being and healthy development of children. 
C Statement of Government Policy by the Minister of Social Welfare in 1991 
Jenny Shipley's paper Social Assistance: Welfare that Works++ described the approach of the 
National Government, elected in 1990, as that of a "modest safety net", with emphasis on 
fiscal savings, an incentive to work and a reduction of "welfare dependence". The safety net 
is to provide a modest standard of living for those who can "demonstrate that matters beyond 
their control threaten to force them into poverty". -is 
This heavily targeted approach has been implemented by a number of statutory amendments 
and restrictive ministerial directives. The result for beneficiaries has been the lowering of 
benefit rates , increased age thresholds for certain benefits, lowered asset and income 
-i3Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1988) 38. 
++(Government Printer, Wellington, 1991). 
-is Above n 44, 13. 
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thresholds, lengthened stand-downs for benefits, the widening of the NZISS's power to obtain 
information and the introduction of penalties and increased fines for fraud. 
III DISCRETION IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
A Delegation of Authority in the Social Security Act 1964 
The Director-General of Social Welfare ("the D-G") is the Department of Social Welfare's 
chief executive.-1-6 She is responsible for administering monetary benefits through the 
NZISS,47 one of three agencies of the Department of Social Welfare ("the Department"). In 
exercising her powers under the Act, the D-G is subject to the general direction and control of 
the Minister of Social Welfare ("the Minister").--18 The Minister may not lawfully use his 
power to override the discretion conferred on the D-G. Section 3A of the Act provides that 
the Minister may delegate powers to the D-G. 
The D-G's own powers, functions and discretions may be delegated to individuals or classes 
of people (ie officers of the Department at various levels) under slO of the Act. The NZISS's 
policies and procedures are contained in five departmental manuals. These manuals contain 
instructions and guidelines for staff on how to interpret the Act. 
B Different Types of Discretion 
In its broadest sense, discretion is separated into two categories: "agency discretion" and 
"officer discretion" . ..i9 Agency discretion is the term applied to the power to make policy or to 
give instructions. An individual's power to apply or interpret rules is known as officer 
discretion. Officer discretion exists in bureaucracies even when no discretion is identified by 
law. For example, an official must exercise judgment in deciding whether or not certain 
criteria have been satisfied or even if a document is genuine. so 
C Limitations on the Exercise of Discretion 
At a first glance some discretions may appear unlimited smce relevant matters for 
consideration are not detailed in the statute. 51 Courts have held that this discretion is to be 
-l-6section 3 of the Act. The current D-G is Mrs Margaret Bazlcy. 
47Section 2 of the Act. 
48section 5 of the Acl. The cun-ent Minister is the Honourable Peter Gresham, MP. 
49Above n 5 A/162.. 
50 Above n 6, 238. 
51 For example, the discretion to grant a special benefit under s6JG. 
considered in light of the statutory scheme and the purpose of the discretionary provision 
within that scheme.s2 
General discretions are also limited by ministerial directives issued under s5 which states that 
the "powers, functions and discretions conferred on the [D-G] ... shall be exercised under the 
general direction and control of the Minister of Social Welfare". The ability of ministerial 
directives to fetter the exercise of statutory discretion has been the subject of judicial attention 
and is discussed in Part V. 
The NZISS's own policy manuals further interpret and limit discretion. This is the 
quintessential example of agency discretion. The NZISS manuals summarise the legislative 
provisions and set out the policy of the Department. Manuals are an essential part of the 
social security process to ensure uniform treatment between different districts and to fill in 
vaguely worded legislation. 53 So, where the Act may confer a very broad discretion on 
officials, this is greatly confined in practice by adherence to the manuals. 
The NZISS manuals specify that they are a complement to the legislation rather than a 
substitute, but evidence shows that manuals are often considered determinative by staff. 5-+ 
Problems arise when the manuals are inconsistent with the legislation, for example, when 
seemingly inflexible rules are specified yet a discretion is conferred by legislation. Further 
problems occur when guidelines retain flexibility but the actual practice of the NZISS does 
not. 
D Broad Principles Surrounding the Exercise of Discretion 
The courts have developed a number of principles to govern the exercise of discretion which 
are summarised as follows.55 The authority in which a discretion is vested must exercise the 
discretion, but it cannot be compelled to exercise it in any particular manner. The authority 
must exercise the discretion in a real and genuine sense: it must not act under the dictation of 
another body, or adopt a fixed rule of policy to prevent the exercise of discretion in individual 
cases. The authority must act in good faith, have regard to relevant considerations and 
disregard irrelevant ones. It must not act arbitrarily or promote purposes that are alien to the 
spirit of the empowering legislation. 
520 1Sulliva11 v Farrer ( I 989) 89 ALR 71. 
53R Cranston Legal Foundations of the Welfare State (Weidenfeld & Nicholson , London, 1985) 216. 
54Above n 5 A/ 163 ; Interview with Catriona Ross, Benefit Rights Co-ordinator, Wellington People's Resource 
Centre, 8July 1996. 
55For a fuller discussion on the principles surrounding the exercise of discretion , sec JM Evans De Smith's 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4 ed , Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1980) eh 6. 
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The fundamental principle that a fixed rule of policy must not prevent the exercise of 
discretion in individual cases is stated succinctly by Taylor:56 
Reliance on policy is not unlawful. What is unlawful is the blind following of policy. 
The normal rule is that each case must be considered on its own merits; a claim that 
the policy should not be followed in a particular case must be considered. This does 
not mean that an exception to policy must be made, but only that the authority should 
be open to persuasion in deciding that. 
The leading New Zealand authority on this issue is the Court of Appeal decision of Hamilton 
City Council v Electricity District Commissioner & Others .57 The Court held that if an Act 
confers a discretion it is unlawful for administrative policy rules to fetter that discretion to the 
extent that the discretion is not exercised in a "real and genuine sense" .58 Therefore, there is 
nothing to prevent the NZISS from setting policy guidelines which specify considerations 
which are to be taken into account for a general class of case. When the policy or practice is 
to apply the guidelines rigidly, regardless of the circumstances of the individual case, 
however, this is an unlawful fetter on the exercise of the discretion. The High Court decision 
of Ankers v Attorney-General59 deals with this very issue in relation to the granting of special 
benefits. The circumstances surrounding the case and the findings of the Court will be 
discussed in depth in Part V. 
The m1srnterpretation of voluntarily adopted rules or guidelines provides a further 
administrative law challenge to the exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeal in Chiu v 
Minister of Immigration held that the significance of such behaviour depends on the context 
in which the misinterpretation occurs, but that in the majority of cases, the misinterpretation 
will "vitiate the decision upon the ground that it constitutes an error of law ... , produces 
unreasonableness in the administrative law sense ... , frustrates a legitimate expectation, or 
causes a delegate to stray beyond the authorised scope of his [or her] delegation".60 In the 
Ankers decision the Judge held that the disregard by staff of the instruction in the Manual to 
consider individual circumstances was unreasonable in the administrative law sense.61 
56a D S Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) 344. 
57(1972] NZLR 605. 
58Above n 57,639. 
59f 1995) 2 NZLR 595. 
60[1994] 2 NZLR 541 , 550. 
6 1Above n 59,607. 
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E The Impact of New Zealand's International Obligations on the Exercise of Discretion 
Recent comments from the judiciary demonstrate that New Zealand's international obligations 
are having an increasing impact on the country's legal system. It is a fundamental principle 
that international treaty obligations are not binding in domestic law until they have been 
incorporated into statute. 62 New Zealand courts have been quick to note, however, that 
conventions ratified by the government are not to be ignored. 
A number of ratified United Nations conventions have a potential impact on the provision of 
social security, in particular articles 9, 10 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 63 Also of potential relevance are the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind the House of Lords 
held that an international convention is not to be the determinative factor when an official 
exercises discretion.64- The leading New Zealand authority on the bearing of international 
conventions on administrative action is the Court of Appeal decision of Tavita v Minister of 
lmmigration.65 In the case, Cooke P commented that it was an unattractive argument that 
administrators were obliged to ignore international instruments and noted that the law relating 
to the effect of treaty obligations on domestic law is undergoing evolution. 66 The reasoning 
in Tavita was affirmed in Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority,67 although the case was 
distinguished on its facts. It is possible to reconcile the British and New Zealand cases by 
reading Tavita as authority that United Nations conventions are a mandatory consideration 
when exercising discretion, but that they are not determinative. 
The bearing of international instruments on the interpretation of social security legislation was 
considered by Thorp J in the first Ankers case.68 The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument 
that the Minister had failed to take New Zealand's obligations under the ICESCR into 
account. Thorp J held that there was no evidence that the Minister had not taken the relevant 
international obligations into account. There was in fact evidence that senior departmental 
62Aslzby v Minister of Immigration [1981) 1 NZLR 222. 
63Article 9 recognises the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance. Article 10 
states that parties to the covenant recognise that the widest possible protection and assistance 
should be accorded to the family. Article 11 recognises the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for the individual and his or her family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
64-[1991) 1 AC 696, 76'2. 
65[!994] 2 NZLR '257. 
66Above n 65,266. 
67(1996) 14 FRNZ 3'2'2. 
68Above n 59, 601. 
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members monitored New Zealand's compliance on an ongoing basis.69 Tavita was 
distinguished on the basis that in that case it was accepted that the Minister had not taken the 
international covenants into account. 
The Court did not consider that it was the judiciary's place to examine the merits of the 
government's analysi s of the situation .7° The Ankers decision appears to follow the New 
Zealand approach to the force of international instruments, such that they are a mandatory 
consideration in the exercise of bureaucratic discretion, but are not determinative. 
V SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF DISCRETION IN THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT 1964 
This section of the paper selects four examples of discretion found in the Act to illustrate the 
differences between legislation , policy and practice in social security. Two forms of 
supplementary assistance have been chosen - the provision under s61G for the grant of special 
benefit, and the Special Needs Grant Programme authorised under s 124(1 )( d). There is a 
strong focus on supplementary benefits since they are traditionally discretionary in nature and 
are designed to cover situations not envisaged by the basic benefit. 
It is generally assumed that the basic benefits are rule-based, providing an entitlement for the 
applicant upon satisfying the legislative criteria. Section 60H(3) of the Act, however, confers 
a discretion on the D-G to impose a 26 week stand-down for an applicant applying for the 
unemployment benefit where the reason for leaving the job or government-assisted scheme is 
by virtue of misconduct as an employee. The policy and practice of this discretion will be 
discussed. 
The final practical example is the discretion found in s86(9A) which gives the D-G the power 
to write off any overpayment upon satisfying certain statutory criteria. It will be shown that 
this section gives the appearance of a statutory discretion, but is actually only discretionary in 
its interpretation , since entitlement arises upon fulfilling the listed statutory criteria. 
A Special Benefit 
One of the "strongest" examples of discretion under the Act is the power of the Department to 
grant a special benefit under s61G. A special benefit is payable to any person, including non -
69Above n 59, 602. 
70Above n 59, 601. 
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beneficiaries, at the discretion of the D-G if she is satisfied that, after taking into account all 
the applicant's financial circumstances and commitments, such a special entitlement is 
justified.71 The NZISS considers that the principal objective of the special benefit is to direct 
individual additional assistance to those who have special and unusual commitments that lead 
to an inability to meet essential living expenses. 72 
There are no set criteria in the legislation for determining whether a person gets a special 
benefit or how much they get. However, the NZISS acts according to a directive from the 
Minister authorised by s5, and applies a formula to get an initial assessment. The important 
variables in the formula are standard costs and fixed costs. 
Standard costs are appendixed to the Ministerial Directive ("the Directive") and include a 
figure which is meant to represent the weekly amount that would be spent on food, bills, 
clothing and entertainment. The standard costs vary according to the benefit the applicant is 
on. If the applicant is not a beneficiary, then the standard cost of the appropriate invalid's 
benefit is taken. 
Fixed costs are defined as regular essential expenses reckoned on a weekly basis arising out of 
the special circumstances of the applicant which cannot readily be avoided or varied. 73 Fixed 
costs include such things, for example, as accommodation costs, hire purchase payments for 
essential household items, certain motor vehicle payments, some transport costs and essential 
child care payments. 
Special benefit is payable for the lesser of either (a) the deficiency between the person's 
income less certain fixed costs and a standard income less $10, or (b) 30% of the applicant's 
fixed costs. It was the application of this formula which gave rise to the High Court decision 
of Ankers v Attorney-Genera[.7-+ 
The decision was not the first instance of external review of the NZISS's practice of 
administering special benefits. In 1994 the Social Security Appeal Authority ("the SSAA") 
stated the NZISS must not use its policy manual to exclude any class of applicants from 
applying for special benefit. 75 The SSAA instructed NZISS that staff must consider each case 
on its merits. The resulting High Court decision shows that the directions of the SSAA had 
not been followed. 
71 section 610 of the Act. 
72New Zealand Income Support Service Main Benefits Manual (reprinted 1 July 1996) para I 1.0100. 
73Direction hy the Minister of Social Welfare 011 Special Benefit (issued 28 March 1995) Part III. 
74Abovc n 59. 
75SSAA Decision No. 106194 (18 November 1994) ; See also SSAA Decision No. 39/93 f 1993) NZAR 524; SSAA 
Decision No. 75193 [ 1993] NZAR 476. 
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1 The Ankers Decision 
In February 1995, Haidi Ankers sought judicial review of the NZISS's handling of special 
benefit applications. The appropriate directive at the time stated that without derogating from 
the duty to have regard to the particular financial circumstances of the applicant, the formula 
as stated above (which had a $20 threshold to pass) , was to be applied when assessing 
eligibility for a special benefit. The Directive stated that the $20 threshold and the 30% fixed 
costs maximum could be disregarded in special or unusual circumstances. The NZISS 
Manual , however, stated only that the formula could be departed from in "very exceptional 
circumstances". No definition of "very exceptional circumstances" was given. 
Thorp J rejected a claim that the Directive was invalid, but upheld the claim that the manner 
of processing applications by the NZISS was unreasonable and illegal. The Court held that 
the use of a formula was not objectionable provided it was used as a guide and not a rule, 
being subject, therefore, to any special and unusual circumstances affecting the applicant.76 
Thorp J held, however, that in practice the effective decision was made by an analysis of 
computer data rather than by the NZISS officer.77 In this sense, no genuine decision was 
made. 
The Court held that the NZISS had misinterpreted the Directive by (a) seldom considering or 
requesting details of special circumstances, and (b) the inadequate reference in the Manual to 
"very exceptional circumstances". 78 Additionally , rules of administrative fairness were 
breached because applicants were not given the opportunity to place all relevant information 
before the decision-maker and were not informed of the criteria used by the NZISS in 
assessing special and unusual circumstances.79 These actions constituted a breach of natural 
justice and s27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
2 ReliefGranted 
In a second decision , dated 7 April 1995, Thorp J held that the plaintiff had authority to 
represent all special benefit applicants since 1 April 1992 given that they shared a common 
interest in the proceedings and that other applicants were financially unlikely to be able to 
bring separate proceedings. 80 The Judge gave relief by way of an order for reconsideration of 
76Above n 59, 599. 
77 Above n 59,607. 
78Above n 59, 606. 
79Above n 59,608. 
80Above n 3, 422. 
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applications after February 1994. Letters were sent to all affected applicants who were 
informed of their right to reconsideration if so desired. Applications prior to February 1994 
were not reconsidered, because the Court held that the cost and difficulty of correcting the 
errors would exceed the likely benefit to applicants. 8l 
By the date of the second decision, a new Directive had been issued.82 The Directive contains 
the broad statement requiring the D-G to have regard to certain matters "without derogating 
from your duty to have regard for the particular circumstances and commitments of the 
applicant". 83 Paragraph 5 of the Directive states that upon complying with the formula 
assessment, the decision-maker "should regard as justified the fixing of a special benefit". 
In his judgment, Thorp J made a very clear statement that the formula was to be considered a 
lower limit on eligibility.8-1- That is to say, if applicants satisfied the formula assessment, they 
became entitled to a special benefit, and that any further consideration could only be to 
increase the amount paid. Otherwise, discretion was retained to grant a special benefit by 
virtue of special and unusual circumstances, even if the applicant did not meet the formula 
assessment. 
3 Following the Ankers Decision 
The new Directive can be seen as a direct result of the findings of Thorp J in the first Ankers 
decision. It is a lot longer than the former directive and contains a myriad of "savers" - broad 
statements to cover the deficiencies found previously. The Directive is very prescriptive and 
details extremely specific examples of allowable fixed costs.85 The effect has been that the 
special benefit programme has become more systematised and bureaucratic than ever 
before. 86 
The most disturbing consequence of the first Ankers decision was the NZISS's policy of 
interpreting the Directive as a guide only, such that the discretion could be exercised above 
and below the formula assessment. Paragraph 9 of the Directive states that: 
81 Above n 3, 4:24. 
82The Directive, issued '.?.8 March 1995, is still cu1Tent. 
83Above n 73, Part I. 
8-J.Above n 3, 4:20-4'.?.l. 
85For example, Part III , Allowable costs - "(h) For a person for whom a telephone is a necessi ty by reason of his 
or her -
(i) Health or disability or family circumstances, or 
(ii) Personal safety or security (for example, an elderly person living on his or her own, or a separated 
person with a non-molestation order against the spouse); or 
(iii) Employment (for example, an electrical worker on call '.?.4 hours per day) ,-
the basic cost of a telephone (excluding toll charges) ... " 
The use of specific examples in a ministerial directive is most unusual. 
86Above n 54. 
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Nothing in this Part of this direction requires you to grant a special benefit, or a 
special benefit at any particular rate, if, in your discretion, you determine that in the 
circumstances of the particular case, such grant ought not to be made. 
Exercise of discretion in this manner was clearly rejected by Thorp J in the later decision,87 
and yet the NZISS's response was to give Paragraph 9 prominence in practice. Nationwide, 
applicants were denied special benefits even though they fitted the formula. The NZISS was 
requiring special and unusual circumstances in addition to fitting the formula before a special 
benefit was granted. In late 1995 the NZISS National Office agreed that this policy 
contradicted the High Court decision and the application of the formula has since become a 
lower limit only.88 
The Directive states that applicants should be told that wherever possible their special benefit 
should be eliminated or reduced within six months of its grant. It provides that cases where 
the special benefit rate is over $50 per week should receive priority. 89 It is submitted that this 
direction contradicts the fundamental policy underlying the special benefit. The general 
principles espoused in the Directive state that special benefit is paid only for costs that are 
essential, not reasonably avoidable and are likely to continue for a period that justifies the 
granting of the special benefit. Given this, the three to six month time limit seems 
unjustifiable. Arguably, the criteria that must be satisfied before eligibility for special benefit 
arises sensibly preclude the carte blanche application of a time limit. 
In practice people receiving special benefit have to go in to the NZISS at three months or six 
months intervals to get their special benefits renewed. If they do not, their special benefit is 
automatically cut. It has been suggested that this practice is potentially subject to the same 
grounds of judicial review as were found in the Ankers case, for breaches of the rules of 
natural justice and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Actl990.90 The correct application of the 
Directive would appear to be a reasonable attempt to reduce costs by applicants. The strict 
adherence to a cut-off point could be seen as misapplication of the Directive. 
Unfortunately, even following the High Court admonition of the NZISS's practice, cases are 
still appearing before the SSAA trying to force the NZISS to actually exercise the discr~tion 
conferred by s61G. Social Security Appeal Decision No 7/9691 states that NZISS must first 
87see text at n 84. 
88Above n 54. 
89Above n 73, Part II. 
90 Above n 5, 10610.20. 
91(16 February 1996). 
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use the formula in the Directive, then look to see if there are reasons for departing from the 
formula by looking to see if there are any special and unusual circumstances. It must not do 
the reverse of this procedure. 
The entire Directive is simply a guide to the exercise of discretion conferred by the Act. 
Social Security Appeal Decision No 36/9(592 reminds NZISS that the Directive cannot 
supplant the discretion of the D-G. This case involved the application by a student for special 
benefit. The Directive states that the living allowance component of student loan is to be 
treated as income for the purposes of special benefit. 
The SSAA stated quite clearly that student loan does not count as income, but it can be a 
factor that the NZISS takes into account when looking at an individual student's financial 
position. By implication, the SSAA has commented that the Directive is invalid. This 
comment has not been taken up by the NZISS, however, because the most recent special 
benefit chapter in the policy manual, updated 1 July 1996, states that "the living component of 
student loan [isj to be treated as income" _93 
Other decisions from the SSAA direct NZISS to include certain items as fixed costs which are 
not specified in the Directive,9'+ waive the standard deduction,95 and alter the standard costs 
component to reflect the reality of the applicant's position.% It is noteworthy that to reach the 
SSAA, these cases must have come through the statutory review processes. 97 At no stage 
previously, had the discretion been correctly exercised. 
These cases show that there are still serious problems with the actual practice of the NZISS. 
The decisions of the SSAA illustrate that NZISS is not following correct procedure even after 
the severe consequences of the Ankers decisions (the re-examination of large numbers of 
special benefit applications). The problems associated with the discretion in special benefit 
are not those commonly identified by academics, such as uncertainty and arbitrariness.98 The 
difficulty is trying to get the NZISS to actually exercise the discretion and not fetter itself 
through self-imposed rules. A much more restricted discretion is found in the Special Needs 
Grant Programme and, as such, the considerations are slightly different. 
92(1 May 1996). 
93NZISS Policy Manual Supplementary Allowances and Grams - Volume 2 (reprinted l July 1996) para 
11.4102; The Department is currently appealing this decision lo the High Court. Telephone conversation 
with Pal Thomas, NZISS National Office, 27 September 1996. 
9-lSSAA Decision No. 106/95 (28 September 1995); SSAA Decision No. 141195 (13 December 1995). 
95ssAA Decision No. 89/95 (8 August 1995). 
%ssAA Decision No. 106/95; SSAA Decision No. 141/95. In these decisions, the SSAA held that teenagers 
should count as having the same costs as adults. 
97These will be discussed fully in Part VII. 
98see text at n 20. 
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B Special Needs Grants 
The Special Needs Grant Programme ("the Programme") authorises the payment of single 
grants for emergency or unforeseen essential purposes. In this respect it differs from special 
benefit which provides ongoing financial assistance to meet continuing costs. Unlike s61G 
which confers a broad discretion on the D-G to grant a special benefit, no expansive statutory 
discretion surrounds the granting of special needs grants ("SNG"). Under s124(1)(d) 
expenditure is allowed for the purpose of granting special assistance under any welfare 
programme approved by the Minister. The Special Needs Grant Programme is the leading 
example, but other programmes include the Childcare Subsidy Programme, the Training 
Incentive Allowance Programme and the Transitional Training Support Programme. 
The objectives of the Programme are to provide non-recoverable financial assistance: 
(1) for specified essential and immediate needs, 
(2) to meet immediate needs in specified emergency situations, and 
(3) to people in rural sectors as authorised in the Programme.99 
The principles of the Programme state that the D-G must consider applicants' abilities to meet 
the need from their own resources and any assistance that might be available from other 
sources. The D-G may consider the extent to which applicants have caused or contributed to 
the immediate need or situation giving rise to the immediate need. 100 
The Programme specifies an income and cash asset limit which cannot be circumvented. IOI 
This is distinguished from the cash asset limit specified in the Directive for special benefit 
which remains only a guide to the interpretation of the discretion conferred by s61G. 
The Programme specifies a number of situations for which the D-G can give financial 
assistance. Usually, one grant per 52 weeks is allowed for the same or similar purpose. The 
language of the Programme is permissive, implying discretion, but in practice, upon satisfying 
the criteria, entitlement seems to arise. Agency discretion, as discussed in Part IV, is 
exercised in interpreting the criteria and deciding whether they are satisfied for the particular 
applicant. 
Discretion is found in the Programme because staff have the option to make more than one 
payment in a 52 week period and to increase the payment above stated limits in exceptional 
circumstances. Additionally, there is a category of "other emergency grants" which may be 
99Minister of Social Welfare Special Needs Grant Programme (1 July 1996) para 2. 
100 Above n 99, para 5. 
101 Above n 99, paras 7 and 8. 
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used if special circumstances exist and the D-G considers that without the item or service 
serious hardship would be suffered by applicants or their dependents. 102 
In practice, however, payments are very commonly restricted to the specified limit. 1ffi The 
Manual makes no mention of the ability to exceed stated limits when describing the available 
categories. 10-+ At the beginning of the chapter, Paragraph 12.0461 contains the broad 
statement that an official may exceed the limit in exceptional circumstances. It is speculated 
that the absence of this statement alongside all relevant categories affects the number of times 
the limits are exceeded. 
The latest programme, issued 1 July 1996, increased the grant for emergency dental treatment 
from $200 to $300. Similarly, in the last few years the maximum allowable annual grants for 
food have increased. In all other respects, the Programme has restricted and more narrowly 
defined the categories under which emergency help is available. 
Many examples of narrowed categories are found in the new Programme. Three instances are 
the transition to work grant, travel for stranded persons grant and the grant for bedding. 105 
With these grants the new Programme details specific criteria, inserts what was previously 
policy into the Programme, and restrictively defines what circumstances the Programme will 
cover. Given these moves, consideration should be given to whether the NZISS actually 
needs policy manuals at all.106 Arguably , it would be better for staff to base their decisions 
on the Programme itself, rather than the NZISS's further interpretation of the Programme as is 
found in the Manual. 
Part IV of the Programme details under what situations emergency grants are available. The 
latest programme inserts extra criteria for establishing an emergency situation. 107 It is 
submitted that the specific provisions contradict the general principles espoused in Paragraph 
5. 100 Paragraph 13.2 states that the D-G must have regard to the foreseeability of the 
emergency situation whereas this is a permissive consideration in the principles. 
Paragraph 16 authorises payments of "other emergency grants". These are available only in 
special circumstances and are limited to $200, although theoretically the limit may be 
102 Above 99, para 16. 
lfficatriona Ross comments that it is not such a problem in Wellington where there are active lay advocates, but 
that there is a marked contrast in areas where no advocacy services exist. She suggests the reluctance Lo 
grant payments over specified limits is a consequence of a general pressure to reduce payments. Above n 54. 
JO-+ Above n 93, eh l'.?.. 
105 Above n 99, parasl 1.3, 11.6 and 11 .7. 
106The same highly detailed and prescriptive approach is found in ministerial directives too. 
107 Above n 99, para 13. 
lOOsee text at n 99, para 5. 
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exceeded in exceptional circumstances. It is submitted that this limit on payment contradicts 
the objective of the Programme which is to meet immediate need. If the circumstances are 
sufficiently special to warrant the granting of an SNG under the "other" category, then surely 
the grant should cover the actual expense incurred. 
The SSAA recently made a similar observation with regards to the Training Incentive 
Allowance Programme ("the TIA Programme" ). 1W The SSAA commented that the TIA 
Programme, as worded, did not fulfil the objects of financially assisting the appellant to 
undergo employment-related training, increasing her prospects of obtaining full or part-time 
work, and gaining independence from the benefit system. 
The SSAA noted that the provisions in the TIA Programme specifying different rates payable 
depending on the type of institution offering the course, were "not consistent with the purpose 
of the empowering section or the objects of the Programme" . 110 In the SSAA's opinion, the 
problem was exacerbated by the absence of any discretion which would have allowed the 
NZISS to deal with any inequities "which are bound to arise in such a tightly regulated and 
targeted programme". 111 As a result, the SSAA directed that the appellant's course costs 
which were not covered by the TIA were to become a fixed cost giving rise to entitlement for 
a special benefit. 
This decision makes a clear statement in favour of a residual discretion in heavily targeted 
programmes. Furthermore, it criticises the provisions of the TIA Programme as not meeting 
the stated objectives. It makes a statement about the interrelationship of welfare programmes 
and the special benefit , and suggests a commonsense approach to deal with the problem. In 
theory , the problems associated with the TIA Programme should not arise under the SNG 
Programme, since a residual discretion is retained for exceptional circumstances. 
Part VII is a recent addition to the SNG Programme and deals with the Programme's 
administration of applications and the payment of grants. The inclusion of these details in the 
Programme elevates them to a higher status than if they were simply NZISS policy. 
Paragraph 23.2 deals with the recovery of grants. The D-G has the discretion to recover 
payments in a lump sum, by instalments or out of a benefit. The recovery of a grant in lump 
sum will , for the most part, have a significant impact on a person 's financial situation. It is 
peculiar that in such a prescriptive programme, no guidelines are given as to how this 
discretion should be exercised. 
1WssAA Decision No. 72196 (18 July 1996). 
IIOAbove n 109, 5 
111 A bovc n I 09, 5. 
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A common complaint about welfare programmes is that they can be changed overnight with 
no consultation. 11 2 Catriona Ross comments that the Programme has changed about four 
times in the last year. 113 There have been sweeping changes, with little or no publicity. For 
example, from 1 April 1996 the $200 non-recoverable grants for dentures, hearing aids and 
glasses were abolished. The effect of this change is significant for beneficiaries needing those 
items. 
C Discretion to Impose a 26 Week Stand-down for Misconduct as an Employee 
Section 60H(3) provides that stand-downs may be imposed if the D-G is satisfied that 
applicants for the unemployment benefit have lost their employment due to misconduct as an 
employee, or have ceased to be part of a government-assisted scheme by reason of 
misconduct. In 1991, the previous maximum stand-down of 6 weeks was changed to a 
mandatory 26 weeks. The Minister sent a clear message that the stand-down was to operate 
where workers put their own jobs in jeopardy through misconduct. 114 
The SSAA has held that the decision to impose a stand-down involves a two step process. 1 JS 
The NZISS must first determine whether applicants have lost their employment because of 
misconduct as an employee. The NZISS must then exercise the discretion whether or not to 
impose a stand-down. SSAA Decision No. 50/92 was an appeal against the decision to impose 
a stand-down simply upon confirmation that the appellant had been dismissed for misconduct. 
The SSAA stated that the NZISS had a responsibility to ensure that the discretion in s60H(3) 
was seen to be exercised in cases of serious misconduct. For the proper exercise of discretion 
the official must ask whether the conduct in question was sufficiently serious (and the 
consequences sufficiently foreseeable) to justify the exercise of the discretion to impose the 
stand-down. 1 16 
Section 60H(3) specifies that there must be misconduct as an employee. The misconduct in 
question must arise out of, or in connection with, the employment. A stand-down should not 
be imposed where, for example, the dismissal is founded in misconduct outside of 
employment which renders the worker unfit for the job. 117 The relevant chapter in the Policy 
Manual does not elaborate or clarify this point. 
112For example, upon receiving the new policy manuals in August 1996, it came lo light that since I July 1996, 
there had been a new programme providing non-recoverable assistance lo non-beneficiaries. Above n 54, 19 
August 1996. 
113 Above n 112. 
11~ Above n 5, A/1277. 
llSssAA Decision No. J 59192 (18 December 1992. 
I l6ssAA Decision No. 34/93 (5April 1993). 
117 Above n 5, A/1'27'2. 
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The Manual recognises that there is no hard and fast rule as to what justifies the imposition of 
a stand-down. The Manual definition of misconduct refers to conduct so seriously in breach 
of the contract of employment that by standards of fairness and justice, the employer should 
not be bound to continue the employment. 118 The Manual correctly recognises that there may 
be situations where a person is fired for misconduct but a stand-down should not be 
imposed. 119 In SSAA Decision No. 2/96, 1'2JJ the SSAA held that it was inappropriate to 
impose stand-down, even though the Employment Tribunal had dismissed the appellant's 
claim of unfair dismissal. The appellant had been dismissed from his job but it did not meet 
the threshold of misconduct. 
It is submitted that in practice staff do not exercise the two step process that is required by 
law. Indeed, staff practice seems to be: 'impose stand-down first, ask questions later'. In the 
last 12 months, all but one of approximately 20 stand-downs examined by the Wellington 
People's Resource Centre were wrongly imposed and overturned. 121 The imposition of a 26 
week stand-down has extreme financial consequences for applicants and their families and, as 
such, greater care should be taken before one is given. 
D Discretion to Write-Off Overpayments 
Section 86(1A) confers a discretion on the D-G to recover payments to which a person was 
not entitled. Section 86(9A) confers on the D-G the discretion to provisionally write-off 
overpayments if the following cumulative conditions are satisfied: 
(1) the overpayment was the result of an error of the NZISS, 
(2) the overpayment was not intentionally contributed to by the beneficiary, 
(3) the beneficiary received the money in good faith, 
(4) the beneficiary has altered his or her position believing the payment to be valid, and 
(5) it would be inequitable, considering all the circumstances, to require repayment. 122 
This is an interesting example of statutory discretion, because although the section is couched 
in the language of discretion, upon satisfying the statutory criteria, an entitlement to the 
118NZISS Policy Manual Main Benefits (reprinted l July 1996) para 5.5041. This definition is taken from North 
v Television Corporation Ltd ( 1977) l ALR 599. 
l l9 Above n 118, para 5.5042. 
1'2JJ(5 February 1996). 
121 Above n 112. 
122The section was inserted in 1973 to remedy situations where an overpayment occurred through no 
fault of the beneficiary and it was unreasonable to expect repayment. 
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writing-off arises. In this sense, there is officer discretion, as discussed in Part IV, but no 
agency discretion. Indeed, Judge Latham of the SSAA has commented in a number of cases 
about the restrictive nature of s86(9A). 123 
Prior to the 1994 decision of Carmichael v Director-General of Social Welfare 124 repayment 
was required if a beneficiary could afford to pay it back. In this case the SSAA held that even 
though the first four criteria were satisfied, because the appellant owned a freehold house and 
had modest savings, it was not inequitable to recover the overpayment. The High Court held 
that the NZISS's decision to recover was unreasonable and unfair in the restricted 
administrative law sense. When the requirements of s86(9A) are all but satisfied it is 
unreasonable and unfair to require repayment solely because a beneficiary possesses a modest 
home and limited savings. 
The error in the Manual has only been corrected in the April 1996 reprint. 125 The new 
Manual states that financial considerations are just one of the circumstances to be borne in 
mind when making a decision whether to write-off an overpayment, citing the "recent" 
Carmichael decision as authority. 126 
However, the practice of the NZISS does not appear to have caught up. In SSAA Decision. No 
40/96, Judge Latham stressed that one's ability to repay is only one of the factors to be looked 
at and is not to be the dominant factor. The Judge cited the Carmichael case and said that the 
appellant's modest means did not make it equitable to require repayment. 
Analysis of whether it is equitable or not to require payment does not focus solely on the 
beneficiary's own circumstances. The length of time taken to discover the error, establish the 
overpayment and notify the beneficiary of the overpayment should be taken into consideration 
as well. 127 
Previous policy manuals have stated that the NZISS may require repayment if beneficiaries' 
circumstances change and they can reasonably be expected to pay. 128 The latest reprint does 
not contain this provision, in response to the SSAA's decision that provisional does not mean 
temporary. 129 Repayment may only be reinstituted if the write-off should never have 
occurred, for example, the requirements were not originally satisfied. Arguably, depending 
123SSM Decision No. 35/96 (6 May 1996); SSM Decision No. 40196 (10 May 1996). 
12-1-(1994) 3 NZLR 477. 
125NZISS Policy Manual Core Topics Manual (reprinted 1 April 1996) para 14.0300. 
126Aboven 125, 14.1100. 
127 SSM Decision No. 47/89 (25 October 1989) - where the delay of 3 years made recovery inequitable. 
128Above n 5, A/2467. 
129 SSM Decision No. 19195 (30 March 1995). 
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on which criteria were not satisfied and the length of time between the write-off and re-
establishing the debt, it could be argued that it would be inequitable to require repayment at a 
later stage. 
Recent decisions of the SSAA show an apparent frustration at the restrictive nature of 
s86(9A). In SSAA Decision No. 35196 and SSAA Decision No. 40/96, Judge Latham drew 
attention to the disproportionate costs incurred by the NZISS in time and expense in relation 
to the small amount involved. In the former case the overpayment was assessed at $72.00 and 
in the latter, $360.54. Both appeals were allowed and the debts were written off. 
In the author's opinion, the problem lies not with the section itself, but NZISS's interpretation 
of the section . If the SSAA considered that the criteria had been satisfied, why could the 
NZISS , through its internal review structures, not have reached the same conclusion? It is 
submitted, that the NZISS caused its own expense by incorrectly interpreting the provision. 
Indeed, s86(9A) seems inherently reasonable, ensuring that only the "deserving" get their 
overpayment written-off. 
In both cases the Judge considered it desirable for the D-G to possess an extra discretion 
allowing her to write-off small sums of money. It is submitted that provision for this already 
exists in s86(1A) where the D-G has the option to recover an overpayment. In an earlier 
decision the SSAA noted that it will be a "rare occasion when the discretion should be 
exercised against establishing an overpayment" , 130 but but the Tri bun al is affirming that the 
discretion is available to the D-G. 
In a recent SSAA decision, however, Judge Latham states that "it is clear that in this 
subsection the word 'may' means empowered and is not to be construed, notwithstanding 
expressions to the contrary in [other SSAA decisions] , as a discretionary power" .131 The 
Judge appears to be interpreting what is clearly a statutory discretion conferred on the D-G as 
an obligation to recover overpayments. The decision is currently being appealed to the High 
Court on this point of law. 132 
l30 SSAA Decision No. 95/93 ( date unknown, page reference unknown). 
13lssAA Derision No. 93196 (21 August 1996) 5. 
132Above n 54, 27 September 1996. Section 12Q of the Act authorises appeals to the High Court on questions 
of law. 
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5 Conclusion 
The practical examples considered have not raised the concerns academics commonly identify 
with discretion, such as arbitrariness and uncertainty .133 The problems relate, instead, to the 
use of detailed directives, programmes and policy which have the result of reducing the 
discretionary provisions to seemingly rule-based procedures. In this context, the concern is 
that the discretion is actually exercised, and that administrative principles surrounding the 
proper exercise of discretion are followed. 13-+ 
VI THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
Part II described how traditionally welfare advocates have supported rule-based procedures 
for the provision of social security. Part V has shown how the result in New Zealand has been 
increasing prescription, complexity and inflexibility. This section discusses the findings of 
the Social Policy Agency's evaluation of the supplementary assistance programmes, proposed 
legislation to address issues highlighted and the response of welfare groups. 
A Findings of the Social Policy Agency 
In 1993 the Social Policy Agency published a report evaluating the special benefit and SNG 
programmes. 135 It noted that increased targeting has led to a greater reliance on residual and 
discretionary programmes to meet basic and ongoing needs. Lack of clear and consistent 
information, variation in quality of service provided by staff and obstructive application 
procedures were identified as barriers to the programmes. 
The Evaluation Team ("the Team") noted that many staff preferred clear policy with little 
room for discretion. 136 This contrasts with the academic writing which suggests that to avoid 
apathy in the workplace, discretion is preferred. 137 Staff had concerns that discretion could be 
used to reflect the values and attitudes of staff to clients and that better training was needed in 
the use of discretion. 138 It was recognised by the Team that a latent function of discretion was 
to encourage staff to operate within a defined budget. 139 
133 See text at n 20. 
13-+see text at n 56. 
135Evaluation Unit An Evaluation of the Special Needs Grant and Special Benefit Programmes (Social Policy 
Agency, Wellington, 1993). 
l36 Above n 135, 20. 
137 Sec Adler and Asquith above n 4. 11. 
138Abovcn 135,21. 
139 Above n 135, 22. 
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The Team noted that there was ieconsistency in interpretation of policy between district 
offices, within offices and between individual staff. The result was confusion for clients, lack 
of faith in NZISS staff and mounting feelings of resentment and injustice. 140 Frequent 
changes in policy were identified as one source of inconsistent delivery of service. 141 The 
Team's recommendations, however, made no mention of restricting or reducing the current 
discretionary elements. Recommendations, instead, focused on simplifying procedures and 
making the programmes more transparent. 142 
In light of the Team's findings, the Ankers cases and a number of SSAA decisions, the 
Government began considering changes to the supplementary assistance programmes. 
Deliberations culminated in the Social Welfare Reform Bill 1995 ("the Bill"). 
B Social Welfare Reform Bill 1995 
The Bill proposed, amongst other things, that supplementary allowances (special benefit, 
SNGs and advance payment of benefits) be governed by regulations. 1-+3 The effect would 
have been the removal of statutory discretion. The move met with strong opposition from 
welfare groups. 14+ 
Welfare groups raised the following areas of concern: 
(1) Regulations, by their nature, are an ineffective means of ensuring that a safety net exists. 
Regulations will cap spending because they will restrict eligibility; 
(2) The empowering clauses in the Bill were too wide and no protection was given that the 
principles of the Act would be followed; and 
(3) The current legislative provisions were not the problem. The inadequacies in the 
provision of supplementary assistance were due to inadequate training of NZISS staff and the 
rigid application of the Directive. 14s 
In introducing the Bill the Minister claimed the regulations would be used to set the 
parameters of these programmes and yet continue to provide adequate assistance where 
necessary. 146 Welfare groups, however, felt there was "no way ... [toj limit or even predict the 
I-IO Above n 135, 22. For example, in one district during May 1992, staff were instructed to cease approving 
applications for SNGs. 
1-tl Above n 135, 23. 
1-+2 Above n 135, 25-27. 
l-+3clauses 27, 39 and 46 of the Bill. 
14+Submissions against the Bill were made by the Wellington People's Resource Centre, Combined 
Beneficiaries' Union, Wellington Community Law Centre, Downtown Community Ministry, Auckland 
People's Resource Centre, to name but a few. 
145Guide to the Social Welfare Reform Bill 1995 (unpublished, Wellington, 1995) 8. 
146(1995) 545 NZPD 5319. 
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complexity and diversity of the human experience and need". 147 In retaining discretion the 0-
G could be forced to consider individual circumstances. Opponents to the Bill argued that the 
Government had acknowledged that the regulatory approach had failed for accident 
compensation and that it would be making the same mistake again in social security if these 
clauses were enacted. 
On 8 March 1995 the Minister announced that he would ensure that in both the legislation and 
regulations the D-G had the discretion to depart from the regulations in special circumstances. 
He denied that it was his intention, in introducing the Bill, to remove any of the discretion 
currently applied within the programmes. 148 
The Minister's reassurance did not allay public concern. Fifty-nine submissions on special 
benefit, 49 submissions on the advance payment of benefit, and 56 submissions on SNGs 
were received by the Social Services Select Committee ("the Committee"). The submissions 
were unanimously opposed to the changes. The Committee decided not to go ahead with the 
regulatory provisions due to the weight of public opposition. 149 As a result, statutory 
discretion is retained for the granting of special benefit, SNGs and advance payment of 
benefits. 
At a superficial level, the action of welfare groups in New Zealand, by seeking discretion over 
the certainty of rules, seems to have contradicted the general overseas trend. It is submitted, 
however, that the approaches are not irreconcilable given that it is unanimously accepted that 
social security systems need to be able to provide individualised justice. Arguably, New 
Zealand welfare groups would campaign against greater discretion in establishing entitlement 
to basic benefits along with their international counterparts. 
C The Different Approaches of Political Parties to Discretion 
The passage of the Bill through Parliament highlighted the different approaches of the two 
main parties to discretion. The Associate Minister of Social Welfare, the Honourable 
Katherine O'Regan, claimed that it was a desire to ensure consistency between regions that 
led the move to a regulatory approach. 150 The National Member of Parliament for Wallace, 
Bill English, affirmed the traditionally conservative approach of the Party by commenting 
that: 151 
147 Above n 145, 8. 
148Ministcr of Social Welfare "Social Welfare Regulations and Discretion" (Press Release, 8 March 1995) 
1-i9social Services Select Committee Report on the Social Welfare Reform Bill 1995 [1995] AJHR 1.13. 
150(1995) 550 NZPD 8799. 
l5l Above n 150, 8804. 
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[ o ]ne of the benefits of entitlements that are certain and legally testable is exactly their 
certainty. One knows what one will get in particular circumstances. When one does 
exercise a wider discretion, that does make the decisions more subjective, and it does 
make it harder to appeal them or to test them with a higher authority. 
These comments are reminiscent of many of the criticisms of discretion discussed in Part II. 
The Labour Party had a markedly different approach to the use of discretion. The Honourable 
Dr Michael Cullen stated categorically that the "Labour Opposition [ would] fight, and fight, 
and fight against the removal of discretionary powers". 152 Mark Burton, Labour Member of 
Parliament, believed that the imposition of regulations were a de facto extension of benefit 
cuts because inevitably assistance to those in need would be cut. 153 He noted that it was 
fundamental to an effective social security net to retain discretion and flexibility. The Labour 
Party comments highlight the benefits of discretion discussed in Part II. 
D Conclusion 
Notwithstanding that the statutory discretion was explicitly retained for the provision of 
supplementary assistance, the administration of these programmes is tightly regulated by the 
ministerial directives and NZISS policy. 154 It is submitted that, in practice, the distinction 
between rules and discretion is becoming blurred. Given that reality, consideration must be 
given to find ways of ensuring that decisions are made according to law and in good practice. 
VII HOW TO ENSURE GOOD DECISION-MAKING 
This section discusses ways to improve the decision-making of staff at the NZISS by 
suggesting action that could be taken internally. Existing structures for review are explained 
and problems associated with these structures highlighted. The Ombudsmen's role is 
examined along with the place of judicial review in the social security context. 
A Improvement of Internal Decision-making 
The reality of the social security bureaucracy is that large numbers of complex decisions are 
made by junior staff. It is submitted that a way to ensure consistency and accuracy is to 
152Abovc n 150, 8802. 
153 Above n 150, 8806. 
15-+see above P.art V. 
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implement a quality control system. A system of quality assurance currently exists within the 
NZISS at both a local and national level. 155 Locally, the work of 10% of randomly selected 
certified competent staff is checked daily by a team quality officer ("TQO"). This method of 
quality control has been used by the NZISS for many years. 
In the last two years a national sample has been analysed for the purpose of providing reliable 
performance information to Parliament. In the latest annual report, national accuracy was 
calculated at 82% for initial benefit applications and 74% for reviews of entitlement. 
Interestingly, the sample did not include any supplementary benefits. Data taken for this 
reporting year will include supplementary benefits, with the exception of SNGs. Phil 
Humphries notes that quality control systems of measurement are not very effective for 
discretionary payments. Instead the NZISS invests in preventative measures, for example, 
discretion training for staff. 
It is submitted that the systems of quality control already operating within the NZISS are 
worthwhile. The results, however, check procedural rather than substantive issues and should 
be read with this in mind. A TQO checks decisions according to NZISS policy. A TQO does 
not check decisions of team leaders or district manag·ers. Therefore, where there is a high 
level of internal delegation, for example in the highly discretionary supplementary benefits, 
the decisions are not checked. Arguably it is the discretionary benefits that need the most 
attention given the large scope for staff decision-making. 
The NZISS's quality assurance data suggests a fairly high accuracy rate in decision-making. 
However, the number of successful reviews and appeals in practice belies that result. The 
Quality Assurance Manager's own words are telling: "While I'm Quality Assurance Manager, 
I can't give anybody any assurance about the quality of the decision-making." It is submitted 
that a further level of quality control is necessary, that of checking that NZISS manuals and 
practice are consistent with the legislation. 
Accurate manuals would go a long way towards ensuring the correct decision is made in the 
first instance. It is well documented that staff rely heavily, and in many cases exclusively, on 
the manuals. Manuals should be constantly updated in response to SSAA and High Court 
decisions, something which does not currently occur at speed. 156 The manuals are currently 
in hard copy. Arguably, if the manuals were computerised they could easily be updated on a 
nationwide basis. 
155The following informalion on Lhe NZISS qualily conlrol syslems was provided during an interview with Phil 
Humphries, Nalional Quality Assurance Manager, 18 September 1996. 
156For example, following SSAA Decision No. 73193 (17 August 1993) where Lhe SSAA held that a certain 
provision in the Manual was illegal, Lhe error was not rectified unlil 1996. 
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The Evaluation Team recommended simplifying application forms. 157 It is submitted that the 
forms could more explicitly draw attention to the circumstances considered by officials when 
making decisions. For example, application forms for special benefit could ask applicants to 
specify if they have any special circumstances which would justify exceeding a specified 
limit. In focusing the applicant on what information is required to make the decision, a staff 
member is, arguably, better equipped to make the correct decision in the first instance. 
It is submitted that staff issues need to be addressed also. Greater resources are needed for 
initial and on-going training. It is assumed that an office environment conducive to good 
work, such as adequate facilities and support, would reduce staff turnover and , 
consequentially, reduce the costs associated with new employees. 
Sossin comments that the publication of administrative jurisprudence would improve 
decision-making. 158 It is submitted that putting the decisions of the SSAA onto a database 
accessible by all officials would be useful for staff members in analogous situations. 159 
Arguably, this is not inconceivable given current technology. 
It is submitted that the NZISS's current computer system, SWIFFf, is not conducive to the 
proper exercise of discretion. The decisions of officials are affected by the "categories" under 
which support must be entered. There are a number of examples where applicants are granted 
supplementary assistance for items, such as shoes or clothing, under the SNG category of 
"Food", because no appropriate category exists and staff are reluctant to enter it under the 
"Other" category. lW The negative consequences for applicants occur if they apply for 
assistance for food later in the year and are declined for having reached their annual limit. 
The value of instituting good procedures to improve service delivery has been recognised in 
the Wellington district offices which have implemented new procedures for reviewing 
decisions. The local initiative, which began on 1 July 1996, ensures that all complaints go 
through a complaints co-ordinator. 161 The complaints co-ordinator determines which team 
leader the reviews will go to. The team leader is then responsible for allocating the reviews to 
customer service officers. The complaints co-ordinator sets a time frame within which the 
reviews need to be decided. The most marked improvement is that the offices have stopped 
157 Above n 135, 25. 
l.58Above n 9, 40. 
l59This , of course, begs the question of the precedent value of the SSAA which will be discussed later. 
l(,O Above n l 12. 
161 Interview with Diana Adams, NZISS Wellington Office Complaints Co-ordinator, 16 September 1996; 
Benefit Forum Minutes (unpublished, Wellington, 30 July 1996). 
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losing applications for review. 162 The initiative is a positive one as it seeks to improve 
internal procedures of the NZISS. 
B Greater Information To Claimants 
The corollary to improving internal structures is the empowering of the "consumer" of the 
social security system. The publication of manuals and guidelines used by the NZISS in a 
language understandable to the general public in a place easily accessible for those intere~ted 
would go a long way towards legitimating the system. Implementing transparent guidelines 
would reduce the concerns associated with discretion and seemingly arbitrary decision-
making. Support for the publication of the manuals is found in the rule of law. 
It is submitted that it would be worthwhile for the NZISS to publish the grievance and appeal 
procedures and have them available in hand-out form in each office explaining, in an 
understandable format, the different stages of review. In the author's opinion, the standard 
notification of the right of appeal found in all NZISS letters does not adequately explain the 
process of review. 
It is submitted that lay advocates are an important tool for applicants at both initial decision-
making and review. Advocates have knowledge in the area, are removed from the power 
imbalance between applicant and official, and have communication skills that less confident 
applicants may lack. The value of advocates has been acknowledged by academics and staff 
alike, 163 and a case can be made for public funding of welfare advocacy groups. 
C Attitudes to Beneficiaries 
Any attempt to improve decision-making must begin with the bureaucrat. The Evaluation 
Team noted that an officer's perception of a client affected the way discretion was 
exercised. 164 In the author's opinion, more can be done by the NZISS to eradicate offensive 
and inappropriate behaviour. In other words, the NZISS needs to take complaints seriously. 
In 1995, the SSAA commented on the need to ensure sensitivity when dealing with 
applicants . In SSAA Decision No. 102/95,165 the SSAA held that the NZISS's letter to the 
beneficiary had been inappropriate and that the behaviour towards the beneficiary (if as 
162Diana Adams commented that officern used to find a stack of reviews, some up to a year old, which had not 
been processed. Above n 16 l . 
163Aboven 10, 409; Aboven 161. 
16'1-Above n 135, 20. 
165(28 September 1995). 
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alleged) had been insensitive, crass and unhelpful. The NZISS was told to ensure that the 
staff member dealing with this beneficiary in the future had tact, sensitivity and good 
problem-solving skills. It is believed that training in cultural sensitivity, interviewing and 
assessment techniques, and consciousness-raising of implicit value systems, would go a long 
way towards improving the quality of service. L66 
The author recognises that it is difficult to change internalised values and attitudes and that 
this is made even more difficult when inappropriate comments come from the judiciary. In 
SSAA Decision No. 35/96 an appeal against the decision not to write-off an overpayment of 
$72 was allowed. Judge Latham made the following comment: "For reasons that will later 
appear, the subtitle of this appeal could well be in Shakespeare's words 'Much Ado About 
Nothing'." 167 
It is submitted that this comment was inappropriate because the appellant satisfied the strict 
criteria of s86(9A) and the appeal was allowed. He had every right to purse his grievance to 
the highest review body. Furthermore, small amounts mean a lot to beneficiaries who are on 
or below the poverty line. These words from a middle-class judge do not send a good signal 
to NZISS staff about appropriate and sensitive behaviour. 
D Structures for Review 
The complexity of the legislation and administration of New Zealand's social security benefits 
requires mechanisms to safeguard individual rights. A variety of methods are available to 
challenge or dispute decisions of the NZISS. The Act provides for a right of review to a 
benefit review committee ("BRC"), the SSAA, and the High Court and Court of Appeal on 
questions of law. The NZISS has inserted a further level of review called an administrative 
review which is an internal review following an initial application for review of decision. 
A person who intends to challenge a decision made by the NZISS is required to fill out a 
review of decision form. If dissatisfied with the administrative review, a person can apply for 
a BRC hearing. The new procedure in the Wellington offices provides that if an 
administrative review is unfavourable, the complaints co-ordinator will automatically book a 
date and time for a BRC hearing. 168 The complaints co-ordinator will then notify the 
applicant of the unfavourable decision, the date and time of the BRC hearing and supply them 
with the NZISS's submission to the BRC. This represents a radical shift in NZISS practice 
which, in the past, insisted on separate applications for review and applications for BRC 
166This was suggested by the Evaluation Team, above n 135 26. 
167 Above n 123, I . 
168see text al n 161. 
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hearings. The Act does state, however, that an application for review is an application for a 
BRC hearing. 169 
Section lOA states that any beneficiary or applicant affected by any decision made by a 
person in the exercise of any power, function or discretion conferred bys 10 against which the 
person has a right of appeal under s 121, 170 may apply in writing for a BRC hearing within 3 
months of receiving notification of the decision. l71 A BRC is composed of two officers of the 
NZISS and a community representative. 172 The decision of any two members is the decision 
of the BRC. 173 On reaching its decision, the BRC must give written notification to the 
applicant of the reasons for the committee's decision and advise of the right of appeal to the 
SSAA. 174 
The SSAA comprises three persons appointed by the Governor-General on recommendation 
of the Minister following consultation with the Minister of Justice.1 75 The decision of the 
majority is the decision of the SSAA. A person has the right to appeal to the SSAA providing 
a BRC hearing has already been held. 176 The SSAA may confirm, modify or reverse the 
decision appealed against in accordance with the Act. 177 The SSAA may ref er the matter 
back to the D-G, advising the D-G of its reasons for doing so and shall give such directions as 
it thinks just as to the reconsideration. 178 The Act specifies that the D-G or any other party 
may have legal counsel before the SSAA, 179 and that the SSAA may award costs to an 
appellant if an appeal is allowed in whole or in part. 180 
Hearings are private unless the SSAA orders otherwise, 181 and it is unlawful to publish 
proceedings unless otherwise authorised. 182 A similar presumption of privacy of decisions is 
found in the Deportation Review Tribunal. Arguably though, decisions of the SSAA involve 
matters affecting the public and are of a much wider concern than the individual bringing the 
appeal. It is particularly important when considering the proper exercise of discretion that the 
principles espoused by the SSAA are transparent and open to public scrutiny. It is submitted 
169section lOA of the Act. 
I70section 12J of the Act states that a person has a right of appeal to the SSAA except on medical grounds. 
l7l Section 1 OA (]) of the A et. 
172section JOA(3) of the Act. 
173section 10A(6) of the Act. 
I74 section 10A(9) of the Act. 
I75section l'.?.A of the Act. 
176section 12J of the Act. The SSAA cannot hear an appeal on medical grounds in respect of an invalid's 
benefit, handicapped child's allowance or tenure protection allowance. 
177section l'.?.M(7) of the Act. 
178section l'.?.M(8) of the Act. 
179section l'.?.K(8) of the Act. 
ISO section l'.?.0(1) of the Act. 
181 Section l'.?.N(3) of the Act. 
182section l'.?.N(4) of the Act. 
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that as a matter of principle the decisions of the SSAA should be public unless ordered 
otherwise. In practice, the majority of the decisions of the SSAA are actually published. To 
date this year, approximately 90% have been published. This action suggests that the SSAA 
recognises the importance of the decisions for the public. 
Section l 2Q authorises appeals to the High Court on questions of law. The High Court may 
grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on questions of law, and the Court of Appeal may 
grant special leave if leave is refused by the High Court. 1&3 
Whilst it can be demonstrated that comprehensive appeal procedures exist in the Act, many 
incorrect decisions go unchallenged. 184 The failure to review should not be equated with 
acceptance of a decision by an applicant. There are a number of reasons why an applicant 
may not appeal against an adverse decision: the decision may be accepted out of grim 
resignation; the applicant may lack confidence, knowledge or experience of the appeals 
system; an applicant may not have the expertise to judge whether or not a decision is correct; 
or an applicant may have difficulty finding independent advice on social security issues. 185 
Applicants who do appeal still find problems with the appeal system. Wellington has an 
internal policy whereby the person who makes the initial decision is given the opportunity to 
reconsider. 186 This is usually supervised by a team leader. Catriona Ross comments that it is 
also possible to get "same person review" when internal delegation levels are at team leader or 
district manager level. This is most common when reviewing decisions involving highly 
discretionary supplementary assistance, for example, where an amount is applied for over 
specified limits. 187 In these circumstances, the review generally upholds the original 
decision. Ms Ross notes that in these situations it is worthwhile to go straight to a BRC 
hearing. Problems occur when the application is for emergency assistance and the appellant 
has the wait for a BRC to be called. 
BRC hearings are held weekly or monthly depending on the office. A decision is received 
anytime from the same day to many months later. !88 The average decision takes about two 
l&3section 12R treats an appeal as if the determination were made under sl07 of the Summary Proceedings Act 
1957. 
1~This is demonstrated by the Ankers decisions; Above n 112. 
185N Wikeley & R Young "The Administration of Benefits in Britain: Adjudication Officers and the Influence 
of Social Security Appeal Tribunals" [1992] Public Law 238, 244-245. 
186Whereas in theory it is possible for the review to be delegated to another, in practice, the same person will 
review it. Above n 54, 4 September 1996. 
187 Above n 186. 
188In one case, the BRC took 7 months to reach a decisions. The BRC was then declared invalid because one of 
the staff members had a conflict of interest. Above n 186. 
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weeks, the greater amount of that time being spent getting the signature of the community 
representati ve.189 
The majority of the criticisms of the BRC process arise from the close link the committee has 
with the bureaucracy. Decisions are made according to NZISS policy rather than a strict 
analysis of the law. 190 If a BRC wants a legal opinion, it receives one from NZISS lawyers, 
the same people who appear for the Department before the SSAA. 191 There are also serious 
issues involving the training of members on the BRC. The training package for staff 
members is not given to the community representatives unless they specifically ask for it. 192 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that an alarming number of community representatives on BRCs 
do not even have access to the Act. 193 Additionally, nationwide there are NZISS staff on 
BRCs who have not received training for the role. 194 
In the author's opinion, the BRC can be considered an arm of the bureaucracy and, as such, is 
not an effective tier of appeal. The decision of the two staff members is sufficient to be the 
decision of the BRC. If, as has been suggested, staff members follow NZISS policy in 
making their decision, the BRC is actually in breach of its statutory obligation which is to 
"review the decision ... in accordance with the Act". 195 
This point is well illustrated by SSAA Decision No. 136/95 in which the SSAA drew attention 
to the unusual step taken by the community representative on the BRC. In a memorandum 
issued by the community representative he stated that: 196 
Our role on the [BRC] is not to promote the NZISS Practice Manual but to determine 
whether the officers making the original decision took into account all matters that 
should have been considered. Both [Departmental representatives on the committee] 
indicated that they felt they could not override the Manual or Department Directives. 
When we accept the role on the [BRC], we are in fact attending on behalf of the D-G 
to exercise her delegated right of discretion .... Nowhere in the [Act] does it state that 
the Manual shall override the principles of the Act and the Supplementary Allowances 
Programme is an obvious section where the D-G must exercise maximum discretion. 
189 Above n 186. 
190Above n 161. 
l91Aboven 186. 
192Above n 186. 
193 Above n 112. 
19-1-Aboven 155. 
195section 10A(8) of the Act (emphasis added). 
196(8 November 1995) 6. 
36 
The SSAA also commented in SSAA Decision No. 60/96 that there was little point relying on 
BRCs if they were not prepared to use the discretion contained in the legislation. These 
comments strongly suggest that the practice of BRCs needs to be addressed. 
The majority of cases are intended to be decided at BRC and the SSAA. As such, the SSAA 
is in a better position than the courts to develop a coherent body of legal principles. The 
NZISS, however, does not consider itself bound by SSAA decisions. 197 In the NZISS's 
opinion, the SSAA only has the power to consider individual cases and, therefore, does not set 
precedent. 198 Arguably , however, this is true of all courts. The NZISS is mindful of 
comments the SSAA makes about the NZISS's general practice but does not feel bound by 
such comments.I99 
It is consistent with the doctrine of precedent that the SSAA may disagree with itself and have 
its decisions overturned by a higher court. There appears to be no justification, however, for 
the NZISS disregarding the principles espoused by the SSAA. The situation appears 
analogous to the now obsolete Accident Compensation Appeal Authority which set precedent, 
even though at a low level. It is submitted that the NZISS is breaching the rule of law and its 
administrative law duties to act fairly and consistently by not considering itself bound by the 
SSAA's decisions. Arguably, if an applicant at a BRC was told that the committee was not 
bound by the decisions of the SSAA, the person could bring proceedings for judicial 
review. 200 
Evidence shows that representation at BRC and the SSAA by lay advocates or lawyers has 
positive results for appellants. 201 Civil legal aid is available for persons appealing to the 
SSAA and those seeking judicial review of NZISS action. 202 If applicants have reasonable 
grounds for taking the proceedings2CB and are not precluded by circumstances in s34(3) of the 
Legal Services Act 1991,204 then they can receive civil legal aid to cover representation by a 
solicitor.205 Civil legal aid is considered a loan and the loan is secured by a charge on 
197 Above n 161; Above n 155. 
198Telephone conversation with Pat Thomas, NZISS National Office, '27 September 1996. 
199 Above n 198. 
200The grounds for judicial review are set out in the text at n 230. 
201 Above n 186; Above n 161 ; R Cranston Legal Foundations of t/ze Welfare State (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
London, 1985) 176. 
202sections 19(l)(h) and 19(1)(b) of the Legal Services Act 1991. 
2ffi Section 34( 1) of the Legal Services Act 1991. 
20+For example, where the applicant exceeds the disposable income and asset limit, fails to provide full financial 
information to sub-committee, or is not a resident of New Zealand and proceedings might reasonably be 
brought in another country, etc. 
205seclion '20 of the Legal Services Act 1991. 
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applicants' land and chattels. 206 The requirement of repayment may be waived in cases of 
substantial hardship. 2ITT 
In practice, applicants are generally required to pay $50 up front. If applicants have an asset, 
they will probably be required to repay the loan. If costs are awarded, these will go towards 
repaying the cost of the representation. If applicants have no asset, there is a high chance they 
will not be required to pay the legal aid back.200 
Evidence shows that beneficiaries are aware of civil legal aid. Over the last 12 months, 75-
80% of applications for civil legal aid were made by beneficiaries, the majority of these being 
accepted. 2W Only two, however, were applications for representation at the SSAA. This may 
be attributed to a lack of awareness by beneficiaries that they can get legal aid for 
representation at SSAA, a reluctance to risk further debt, and the procedural hassle involved 
in applying for legal aid for a benefit issue. Arguably, however, given the financial 
circumstances of most beneficiaries, they would get the requirement of repayment waived due 
to substantial hardship. If not, and the appeal was successful either wholly or in part, the 
appellant could apply to the SSAA for costs against the Department.210 
Even though a comprehensive statutory appeal system exists, problems have been identified 
with the application in practice. The BRC tier, in particular, lacks credibility as an objective 
review on the merits of the decision. On average, 80% of original decisions are upheld by 
BRC.211 An argument could be made for the creation of independent review officers to do 
the job which is currently left to the BRC.212 This approach has been adopted in the 
Australian social security context.213 It is submitted that the officers would be legally trained 
and legislatively autonomous from the NZISS, improving decision-making at the first level of 
review. This would contrast markedly with current practice in New Zealand where, in many 
cases, the person who made the original decision reviews it, and where both the 
administrative review and BRC adhere rigidly to NZISS policy rather than the legislation. 
Even though the next tier of appeal, the SSAA, does provide the necessary independence, it is 
submitted that it is unreasonable and inexpedient to have to reach the highest level of appeal 
206section 40 of the Legal Services Act 1991. 
2ITT Section 37(3) of the Legal Services Act 1991. 
200TeJephone conversation with Elizabeth Urquhart, Acting Secretary of Legal Services Sub-committee, 
Wellington, 10 September 1996. 
2WTelephone conversation with Chris Smith, former Acting Secretary of Legal Services Sub-committee, 
Wellington, 11 September 1996. 
210Section 120 of the Act. In SSAA Deen No. 23/96 (19 March 1996), costs of $600 were awarded against the 
Department. 
211Aboven 161; Aboven 186. 
212This would be analogous to the internal review by independent solicitors in the Child Support Agency. 
213 Above n 53,217. 
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to achieve a review of decision according to the law. There may also be barriers to appeal to 
the SSAA such as the psychological obstacle of appearing before a judicial body and the time 
it takes to get a hearing. 214 
A foreseeable problem with independent review officers is the requirement for legislative 
change. Arguably, similar improvements could be achieved through changes in policy and 
practice at the BRC stage. If all members of BRCs were comprehensively trained, including 
training on statutory interpretation, and were directed to decide the case according to law and 
not policy, there would be substantial improvement. 215 The BRC would be seen less as an 
arm of the bureaucracy if staff members on the committee were not heavily involved in the 
day-to-day affairs of the district office, as they currently are. It is submitted that changes such 
as these would improve the quality of review at the BRC stage, reduce the number of appeals 
to the SSAA, and save the government time and money. These improvements could be 
achieved without changing the legislation, but simply the policy and practice of the NZISS. 
E The Ombudsmen 
The NZISS is subject to investigation by the Ombudsmen.216 An investigation may follow a 
complaint by a person or by the Ombudsmen's own motion. 217 There is a statutory bar to 
investigation if a right of review on the merits of the decision exists, for example to the 
SSAA. The Ombudsmen may override that bar if they think it is unreasonable for the 
complainant to have to resort to it. The Ombudsmen may refuse to investigate a complaint if, 
in the Ombudsmen's opinion, the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious, not made in good 
faith, or if the complainant does not have sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of 
the complaint. 218 
The Ombudsmen have wide powers of investigation. The Ombudsmen may regulate their 
own procedure subject to the provisions of the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and rules from the 
House of Representatives. 219 Before an investigation, the Ombudsmen have to inform the 
Head of Department or principal administrator of their intention to conduct an 
investigation. 220 The investigations are conducted in private and the Ombudsmen may make 
21-1-see also text at n 185. 
2!5 Adequate training of BRC members will become particularly important from next year when a member of the 
New Zealand Employment Service will be on committees for decisions regarding the imposition of stand-
downs following worktcsts. 
2I6section 13(l)(a) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. The Department of Social Welfare is listed in Part I of the 
First Schedule. 
217Section 13(3) of the Ombud men Act 1975. The Ombudsmen may also be asked to conduct an inve ligation 
by the House of Representatives and the Prime Minister (s l3(4) and (5) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975). 
218section 17(2) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
219section 18(7) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
220section 18(1) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
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inquiries as they think fit. 221 Section 19 of the Ombudsmen Act 1975confers on the 
Ombudsmen wide powers to call evidence. 
The Ombudsmen have wider grounds of investigation than the courts. They are not confined 
to legality. If an investigation concludes that a decision was contrary to law , unreasonable, 
unjust, oppressive, improperly discriminatory, based wholly or partly on mistake of law or 
fact , or simply wrong, the Ombudsmen have a number of available remedies.222 
If the Ombudsmen think a matter should be referred to an appropriate authority for further 
consideration, an omission rectified, the decision cancelled or varied , the practice altered, the 
law reconsidered, reasons given or any other steps taken, they may report their opinion and 
reasons to the appropriate department and may make such recommendations as they consider 
fit. 223 
The Ombudsmen usually aim for compromise, such that no recommendations are required. If 
recommendations are made, they are usually followed , even though they are not legally 
binding. If no adequate action is taken in a reasonable time, the Ombudsmen may send a 
copy of their report and recommendations to the Prime Minister and the House of 
Representatives. 224 
The Ombudsmen receive more than twice the number of complaints against the Department 
than any other government department.225 The last two years have seen a substantial increase 
in the numbers of complaints made specifically against the NZISS. In the year ending 30 
June 1995, 50 complaints were made against the NZISS, whereas 105 complaints were made 
the following year. Those figures are not completely accurate either, as some complaints 
were not distinguished as NZISS and were simply attributed to DSW complaints. For the 
year ended 30 June 1996, 39 NZISS complaints resulted in informal enquiries, 25 were 
declined because an adequate remedy or appeal was available, 8 were resolved informally, 
and 6 were resolved formally .226 
Statistics show that the Ombudsmen have an important role in checking the practice of the 
NZISS. Complaints to the Ombudsmen are free , and the process is informal , quick and 
effective. The number of complaints about the NZISS has doubled in the last two years, and 
221 Section 18(3) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
222section 22(1) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
223section 22(3) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
224section 22(4) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
225 Reporl of the Ombudsmen (For lhe Year Ended 30 June 1996) AJHR A.3 , 15. 
226Facsimile from Emma Bonnett, Office of the Ombudsmen, 18 September, 1996. 
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it is suggested that those numbers will continue to rise as people become more aware of the 
Ombudsmen and their powers. 
F Judicial Review 
Judicial review of administrative action is seen by Bradley not as a "procedure for ensuring 
good administration in the mass of departmental decisions so much as a residual safety valve, 
able to resolve issues of principle and set standards of conduct when government is 
considered to have acted unlawfully or unfairly" .227 In his opinion, the more comprehensive 
the provision of accessible remedies for particular classes of decision, the less the need for 
recourse to judicial review. 
The courts have shown judicial restraint where the body of knowledge and expertise of the 
decision-making body is beyond that of the court. 228 In a decision involving Britain's 
supplementary benefit scheme, the High Court held that "when Parliament entrusts an expert 
body of people, whether they be tribunals or civil servants and independent inspectors, with 
the task of fulfilling the intentions of Parliament in a specialist sphere, the courts should be 
very slow to interfere" .229 Arguably, however, the three substantive grounds for judicial 
review are still available to review social security administrative action. 
The three mam grounds for judicial review are illegality, irrationality, and procedural 
impropriety. 230 These grounds are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. To avoid 
illegality, decision-makers must understand correctly the law that regulates their decision-
making power and give effect to it.231 Ultra vires or illegality covers three situations: 
1. an abuse of discretionary power by exercising discretion for an improper purpose, on 
irrelevant grounds, without regard to relevant considerations or by acting in bad faith; 
2. abdicating a statutory discretionary power by adopting fixed rules of policy, fettering 
discretion by contract or representation, acting under dictation of another, or improper 
delegation; and 
3. committing a reviewable error in making findings of fact or law. 232 
227 Cited in Wikeley, above n 185, 238. 
228Regina v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Data.fin pie [1987) l QB 815,841. 
229 R v Social Fund lnspec!Or, ex parte Ali Unreported, 13 November 1992, High Court, citation incomplete, 
Brooke J. 
230 council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935, 950. 
231 Above n 230,950. 
232p A Joseph Co11stit11tio11al and Administrative /,aw in New Zealand (The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 
] 993) 677 - 704. 
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A decision is held to be irrational if it is so outrageous that no sensible person who applied his 
or her mind could have arrived at it.233 There are two elements to procedural impropriety -
the rule against bias and audi alteram partem. The rule against bias specifies that the person 
taking the decision should not have an interest in the outcome, and audi alteram partem 
(literally, hear the other side) provides that affected parties must be given adequate notice and 
the opportunity to be heard. 234 
Over the years, Lord Cooke of Thomdon appears to have reduced the substantive principles of 
review to simply that "the decision-maker must act in accordance with the law, fairly and 
reasonably". 235 He contends that a tripartite structure remains but adds that the threefold duty 
merges rather than being discreet.236 
Other possible grounds of review include: the legal rights conferred under the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990; substantive fairness, where not only the procedure but the result 
should be fair;237 proportionality, in circumstances where the interference with a citizen's 
affairs by an administrator is disproportionate to the objectives said to justify the 
interference; 238 legitimate expectations, where there is a legitimate expectation of procedure 
the courts will require that;239 mistake or misrepresentation;2-IO and the "innominate ground of 
review" where something has gone wrong which is of a nature and degree that requires the 
intervention of the court.241 
Judicial review does not, under the established grounds of review, examine the merits of 
decision-making. It is a residual safety valve to resolve issues of principle and set standards 
of practice. Judicial review of decisions of the NZISS is rare. Whilst judicial review is an 
option for a person affected by a decision of the NZISS, in practice, it is the least used avenue. 
The Ankers decisions are the most recent proceedings for judicial review of actions of the 
NZISS.242 In these decisions Thorp J held that the NZISS had unreasonably and invalidly 
processed special benefit applications. The Court ordered the reconsideration of special 
benefit applications since February 1994.243 
233 Above n 230, 951. This is commonly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness following the decision in 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpora/ion [1947] 2 All ER 680. 
23-+Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1973) vol 1, para 68. 
235 New Zealand Fishing Industry Associalion Inc. v Minis/er of Agricu/Jure and Fisheries [ 1988) l NZLR 544, 
552. 
236 Above n 235, 552. 
23? Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130, 149. 
238 Above n 230, 950. 
239 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [l %912 Ch 149. 
2AOMartin v Ryan l1990] 2 NZLR 209,224. 
241 Regina v Take-Over Panel, ex parte Guiness [1990] l QB 146, 160. 
242Above n 59; Above n 3. 
243see text at n 80. 
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Barriers to judicial review by beneficiaries include the cost of the process, the delay involved 
in hearing the case, and the fact that a beneficiary has an ongoing relationship with the 
NZISS. When review is sought, however, the use of class actions provides access to remedies 
for the large number of people who share a common interest. Representative actions allow 
people who would not normally be able to fund a separate action, access to the results of the 
proceedings. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
A mixture of both discretion and rules enables the most efficient functioning of bureaucracies. 
Traditionally , rules have provided certainty, whilst discretion accommodates individual 
circumstances. This paper has shown, however, that in the New Zealand social security 
context, the distinction between rules and discretion is becoming blurred in practice. 
Over the last five years, the Government has introduced aggressive targeting to social 
security. This has resulted in tightly regulated ministerial directives and welfare programmes 
governing the exercise of discretion in supplementary assistance. The courts have noted that 
upon satisfying the tight criteria of ministerial directives, entitlement to assistance arises. The 
effect has been the creation of a discretionary supplementary assistance programme not too 
dissimilar from a rules-based system. 
Indeed, the problems associated with discretion in the social security context are not those 
raised by academics, such as arbitrariness and uncertainty for the applicant. Instead, the 
difficulty is trying to get the New Zealand Income Support Service to actually exercise the 
discretion in practice. The paper has analysed the occasions on which the practice of the 
NZISS has been criticised and has highlighted problems with the exercise of other statutory 
discretions. 
Notwithstanding the tight regulation of discretion, there is strong support for the retention of a 
residual discretion to ensure individualised justice. In 1995 the Government attempted to 
remove the statutory discretion currently authorising special benefit, SNGs and the advance 
payment of benefits, and replace it with authorisation by regulations. The move met with 
strong opposition and was eventually dropped due to the weight of public disapproval. In a 
recent SSAA decision, the Tribunal commented on the problems that arise in supplementary 
assistance programmes that do not retain a residual discretion. 
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Acknowledging the current reality of the blurred boundaries between discretion and rules, 
consideration has been given to ways of improving decision-making generally. The paper has 
suggested that much can be done within the NZISS itself to improve both initial decision-
making and the appeal process. A number of issues involving the NZISS's practical 
application of statutory discretion have been highlighted, and the author submits that these 
need to be addressed in order for the NZISS to legitimate its position as the administrator of 
New Zealand's social security regime. 
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